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beliefs-are best given whatever evidence is deemed relevant).
Even if Helm's defense of certain belief-policies is not as satisfying as
one might hope, we can still learn something from his way of conceptualizing the issues. For example, Helm would have us ask "What can we
say in support of the higher-order belief that beliefs formed by sense
perception have some presumption in their favor?" in place of the more
familiar "Can we give a non-question-begging defense of the reliability
of sense perception?". It may be that Helm's way of asking these questions will open new possibilities for those who wish to answer them, or
perhaps make clearer that certain answers must always be unavailable.
Belief Policies offers a novel and, in my judgment, useful approach to
its subject matter. This book provides a new perspective from which to
view some issues in epistemology that already receive a good deal of
attention. It also pushes to the surface interesting and important issues
that do not receive enough attention, such as questions about the role of
the will in belief formation and parallels between epistemology and
ethics-parallels that can be eclipsed by other waX's of approaching epistemology. This is a fine book well worth reading.

* Thanks to my colleagues Tony Ellis, Gene Mills, and Peter Vallentyne
for helpful comments on an early draft of this review.

The God Who Acts, edited by Thomas F. Tracy. University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. Pp. x and 148. $28.50 (Cloth);
$14.95 (Paper).
CHARLES TALIAFERRO, St. Olaf College.
This is a fine collection of four original papers by philosophers and
theologians on the theistic concept of Divine agency. Each of the papers
is followed by a critical response from different authors and the result is
a book that is genuinely a case of philosophical theology (or, if you like,
theological philosophy).
In "Divine Action: Some Moral Considerations" Maurice Wiles articulates an ostensibly deistic version of Christianity. He defends the intelligibility of thinking of God as the creator and sustainer of the cosmos, a
God who creates but does not author miracles or other specific providential events. He adopts a free-will defense to preserve the belief in God's
goodness. According to Wiles, creation involves a severe divine self-limitation and "the concept of divine intervention clearly constitutes a qualification of the nature and extent of that divine self-limitation" (p. 22).
Supernaturalist versions of theism in which God does intervene in
human history face a serious ethical problem. If God intervenes to save
some people and not others, this is unfair. With respect to the Matthaen
story of the Massacre of the Innocents, Wiles asks: "If God warns
through dreams, why only Joseph'? Were the other children of
Bethlehem dispensable?"(p. 21) If specific divine acts that prevent disas-
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ters are part of God's plans, why aren't such saving acts more widespread? Over against the testimony of some Christians to have benefited
from divine providence, Wiles writes: "In many cases the nature of such
claimed interventions seems trivial when set in the context of Auschwitz
and Hiroshima, which no providential action prevented" (p. 22).
In his reply, R. M. Adams draws attention to the ways in which belief
in Divine intervention can assist, rather than hinder, the cause of theodicy. An appreciation of theistic portraits of how God interacts with creation can enhance our conception of the goods that may be realized
through suffering, and belief in the miracle of an afterlife can broaden
our view of creation and the prospects of the ultimate triumph of good
over evil. "By offering a much larger theater for the working out of
God's purposes for us, the belief in life after death opens the way for
some accounts of God's purposes in permitting evils-accounts that
would otherwise be impossible or most implausible" (p. 35). This seems
to me to be fundamentally correct and, as the belief in an afterlife appears
to be best cast as belief in Divine miraculous intervention, an effectual
challenge to Wiles' deistic theology. Perhaps only Joseph is warned on
one occasion and some children are not saved from a tyrant, but if those
children who died, indeed if all persons who die, are annihilated at
death, one has to turn Wiles' question around: Can Wiles secure a belief
in the goodness of God while believing all created persons are dispensable? As for Wiles' allusion to Auschwitz, consider Dan Cohn-Sherbok's
observation from his insightful paper, "Jewish Faith and the Holocaust."
Cohn-Sherbock reviews the different moves in Holocaust theology and
concludes that belief in an afterlife is essential for Judaic theism.
Yet without this belief [in an afterlife], it is simply impossible to
make sense of the world as the creation of an all-good and allpowerful God. Without the eventual vindication of the righteous in Paradise, there is no way to sustain the belief in a providential God who watches over His chosen people. The essence
of the Jewish understanding of God is that He loves His chosen
people. If death means extinction, there is no way to make sense
of the claim that He loves and cherishes all those who died in
the concentration camps-suffering and death would ultimately
triumph over each of those who perished. But if there is eternal
life in a World to Come, then there is hope that the righteous
will share in a divine life." I
Adams upholds a strong conception of God's love and intimate concern
with creation in keeping with Cohn-Sherbock's thesis.
A further point worth noting in reply to Wiles is that it is not clear
whether Wiles' own deistic defense avoids the problem of unfairness. If
miracles are only permissible if evenly distributed, does it follow that
natural benefits should only be bestowed by God's all embracing creative action if evenly distributed?
In "Divine Action: Shadow or Substance" William Alston provides a
brilliant defense of an agentive view of God, over against a series of
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philosophical and theological objections. James Gustafson's reply is
commendable for his raising a host of questions about the ethical and
religious implications of how we conceive of God's agency, though
some of his reservations about Alston's paper are difficult to make out.
Alston claims that "divine action is at the heart of the Christian tradition .... The Christian God is, preeminently, a God Who Acts" (p. 41).
Gustafson does not seem to deny Biblical and traditional witness to a
God who acts. Instead, his worry is whether "the focus on the God Who
Acts excessively subordinates other strands of theology found in the
Bible" (p. 66). On this front, he highlights Biblical references to God's
power and glory as "seen through the beauties and terrors of nature,"
and concludes that "it is at least arguable" that in such accounts "God is
interpreted power and order, related to the world less as actor than as
impersonal reality to be confronted and praised" (pp. 64, 65). I do not
see why Alston should be read as denying Biblical testimony of God
being perceived through nature nor denying that God's reality vastly
extends beyond the realm of persons, if by that we mean something
peculiarly human. I believe Alston correctly sees our human life and the
language of intentionality and agency as a key to understanding theistic
language, but it is important to appreciate that he goes to great lengths
to secure his position against a facile charge of anthropomorphism.
To an extent, Gustafson's chief complaint seems to be that he wants
more from Alston. In reply to Alston's appeal to Christian experience,
Gustafson writes:
One wonders if Alston would include in his view what many
contemporary theologians claim to be the experience of God as
liberator from social, economic, and political oppression
through the conflicts in many arenas of life. The experience of
God as Redeemer is found in historical processes of social conflict and social change for many liberation theologians: Latin
Americas, Africans and Asians, feminists, and others" (p. 68).
Alston's paper is a defense of the intelligibility of believing God acts in
the world against a series of important objections, objections which do
not so much as "excessively subordinate" the idea that God acts as deny
it altogether. For a fuller account of the specific ways in which God acts
in the world, a different, obviously far more extensive project is
required. As for Gustafson's query just cited about Alston's view of liberation theology, insofar as Alston's main thesis is plausible, then Alston
has succeeded in defending the coherence of the belief that God acts in
specific ways to liberate the oppressed. Where Gustafson tries to fill in
what Alston's view might involve, or at least encourage, the ground is
not very firm. "The position proposed by Alston is similar to various
forms of Christian piety that are deeply individualistic, anthropocentric,
and utilitarian." (p. 69). Alston's stance is no less similar to views and
religious practices that are categorically opposed to individualism,
anthropocentrism, and utilitarian (p. 69).
The two final papers,
"Divine Action, Created Causes, and Human Freedom" by Thomas

457

BOOK REVIEWS

Tracy, and "Human Freedom, Human Sin, and God the Creator" by
Kathryn Tanner, with replies by David Burrell and William Hasker,
respectively, address the problem of sustaining a credible account of free
will in a theistic cosmos. Can one preserve incompatibilist libertarianism and belief that God directly or indirectly causes all our actions?
Tracy concludes that "if our acts are directly enacted by God, then there
is an important sense in which they are not free, and if they are free in
this strong sense, then they cannot be direct acts of God" (p. 97). Hasker
agrees. Tanner seeks to preserve the freedom of creatures and the
absolute dependence of creation on God by carefully distinguishing levels or dimensions of causality. Burrell does as well, though Hasker
thinks these moves are unsuccessful.
Hasker's stance is firmly in tune with the new "Openness of God"
movement, a movement which, if Hasker is right, Tanner herself might
have joined. In an effort to reconcile her strong conception of Divine
sovereignty with recognizing sin as authored by human creatures,
Tanner casts sin as a privation or defect, a failure in terms of action and
attention, rather than a positive activity. In reply Hasker construes this
inactivity or inattention as causal human contributions to creation and
he is therefore "happy ... to welcome her into the fold" (p. 146).
Whether part of the "Openness of God" fold or not, the Tanner and
Burrell entries force one to struggle with an important paradox at the
heart of monotheistic tradition. Tracy offers some helpful suggestions at
the end of his paper as to how limited double agency might occur. This
falls short of solving the paradox of double agency in Tanner's work, but
it makes some headway in elucidating how "God continuously brings to
bear the pressure of the divine purpose for us without simply displacing
our purposes for ourselves" (p. 102).
NOTES
1.
"Jewish Faith and the Holocaust," Religious Studies, vol. 26, pp. 292,
293. I argue for a similar position in "Why We Need Immortality," Modern
Theology 6:4, 1990, pp. 367-379.

